06.06.2024 Cybercrimes

How do the Cyberpolice and the SSU cover fraudulent call centers for monthly kickbacks?

Cyberpolice and the Center for Countering Disinformation once again warn of hostile Psychological Operations, PSYOP. This time, the Russians are distributing SMS messages calling for cooperation on behalf of the military police. 

Given these warnings, a number of questions arise. For example, in more than 2 years of full-scale war, can’t the technical specialists of the Cyber Police and the SSU Department of Counterintelligence Protection of the State’s Interests in the Field of Information Security limit the distribution of similar messages? Just as mobile operators have no influence on this process. Given that such actions do not require the involvement of a particularly large amount of resources and extremely complex knowledge?  

Why are our law enforcement officers only able to prevent, not actually counteract? And also to cover up, but not actually stop the spread of fraud, debauchery and deception within the country? 

It’s no secret that call center networks continue to operate actively, deceiving not only Russians by posing as employees of Sberbank and other Russian institutions, but also Ukrainians and Europeans by offering charitable assistance, medicines and finance. 

One of the thousands of examples of fraudulent institutions that profit from Ukrainians during the war is a group of call centers in the Solomyansky district of Kyiv controlled by the Konovalenko family. The call centers are located at 23 Hryhorii Hulyanytskoho Street (formerly Moskovska Street), 4th and 5th floors, and 23 Kniaziv Ostrozkykh Street, Kyiv, on the 4th and 5th floors of the building, and use Internet service providers to defraud people both in Ukraine and abroad.

Law enforcement officers are well aware of the spread of Konovalenko’s call center network within the capital, but for obvious reasons, they are in no hurry to cover up their activities. From our own sources, it became known that the monthly fee for silence and inaction of law enforcement officers is about 15 thousand dollars. 

So, are the cyber police, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Bureau of Investigation, and others interested in taking real action against call centers, onlyfans, unfortunate arbitrageurs, traders, info gypsies, and the like? 2 searches at Slobozhenko’s place and 0 actions showed only that the owner of Traffic Devils was successfully fleeced and probably “put on interest.” 

The Office of the Prosecutor General, what about criminal proceedings No. 42024102100000092 under Part 1 of Article 364 of the Criminal Code (Shevchenkivskyi District Prosecutor’s Office in Kyiv), No. 12023100090002299 under Parts 3, 4 of Article 190 of the Criminal Code (Solomianskyi Department of the Kyiv City Police) and dozens of others?

Returning to the topic of hostile IPSO, the technical specialists of the NGO “Non-Stop” have prepared a brief instruction for the Cyber Police and the specialized department of the Security Service of Ukraine on how to limit the sending of SMS messages on behalf of Ukrainian state bodies. Keep it so that you don’t have to be warned a hundred times.

“Sender ID spoofing – replacing the name of the sender of an SMS with any desired malicious value Police, Security Service of Ukraine, Banks, State Services, various services and services is a serious threat in the field of mobile communications and security:

  1. Sender ID Authentication and Verification: Operators may require pre-registration and verification of Sender IDs to ensure the legitimacy of the sender. Only registered and verified Sender IDs can be used to send messages.
  2. Filtering and monitoring traffic: Using monitoring systems to track and analyze inbound and outbound traffic. This allows you to detect suspicious activity and Sender ID spoofing.
  3. Use of special algorithms: Developing and implementing algorithms to detect anomalies in SMS traffic.  These algorithms can automatically recognize and block suspicious messages based on the keywords used for the Sender id.
  4. Cooperation with other operators and organizations: Sharing information about suspicious Sender IDs and spoofing methods with other operators and organizations to create a single database of suspicious numbers and sources.
  5. Customer education and awareness: Operators can run awareness campaigns for their customers, explaining how to recognize and avoid fake messages and what to do if they receive them.
  6. Strengthening legislation and regulation: Enact and enforce strict laws and regulations to combat Sender ID spoofing, which may include heavy fines and other sanctions for violators of cellular operators.”

If you have become a victim of digital crime or call center fraud, please contact the Association for the Protection of Defrauded Investors, whose specialists are obviously more competent than local law enforcement. 

In addition, if you have information about the operation of specific call centers, onlyfans, web studios, please contact us via chatbot or email at info.nonstopukraine@gmail.com

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